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BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES.

PHILOSOPHY. By *Nicholas Murray Butler*.

MATHEMATICS. By *Cassius Jackson Keyser*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1908.

We have received two pamphlets of the Columbia University series of lectures on science, philosophy and art which are now in progress of publication. The one entitled "Philosophy" by President Butler is a survey of the present situation in the philosophical world which contains valuable suggestions and illuminating flashes of light. We quote the following sentences verbatim:

"To grasp in fullest significance the movement of contemporary thought, and to pass judgment upon it with some approach to a proper sense of proportion, the student must know his Kant. Max Müller's phrase was a good one: 'Kant's language is the *lingua franca* of modern philosophy.' It is not too much to say that without an understanding of Kant the door to a just appreciation of modern thought is closed....

"It is said of Kant that he used to tell his students at Königsberg that he sought to teach them, not philosophy, but how to think philosophically. This view of the teaching of philosophy, which I hold to be the correct one, is the reason why students of philosophy, particularly beginners, should concern themselves with the works of the genuine masters of philosophic thinking, and not waste their time and dissipate their energies upon the quasi-philosophical and the frivolously-philosophical writing, chiefly modern and largely contemporary, which may be not inappropriately described as involving Great Journeys to the Homes of Little Thoughts!

"The clever intellectual posing and attitudinizing of Nietzsche, whose body and mind alike were sorely stricken with illness, is only a travesty upon philosophy. The curiously barren efforts of Haeckel, when he leaves the field of science in which he is an adept, are but little better. Even the form of philosophy called Pragmatism, for which the great names of Oxford, Harvard and Columbia are academic sponsors, and which when unfolded to the man in the street leads him to howl with delight because he at last understands things, should come late and not early in a student's philosophical reading. A background of considerable philosophical knowledge will aid in giving it a just appreciation. There are critics who have the fear that Pragmatism, in its attempt to be both profound and popular, may, forgetful of the ancient warning of Plautus, suffer from attempting to blow and to swallow at the same time."

The essay on mathematics, written by Professor Keyser, may fitly be called a rhapsody on mathematics. To our mind Professor Keyser's scorn of applied mathematics in contrast to popular mathematics is exaggerated. It seems to us that applied mathematics is the best explanation of the seriousness and the paramount significance of mathematical truth. At the same time we do not venture to criticize Professor Keyser for his admiration of pure mathematics which looms like a lofty peak into the heavens while its roots are buried in earthly soil. We were especially pleased with the following passage:

"Phrase it as you will, there is a world that is peopled with ideas, ensembles, propositions, relations, and implications, in endless variety and multiplicity, in structure ranging from the very simple to the endlessly intricate and complicate. That world is not the product but the object, not the creature but the quarry of thought, the entities composing it—propositions, for example,—being no more identical with thinking them than wine is identical with the drinking of it. Mind or no mind, that world exists as an extra-personal affair,—Pragmatism to the contrary notwithstanding."

The world of mathematics is not a mere fantastical construction but it is the reconstruction of a world of necessary relations, and as such it possesses an objective significance. It is not man-made nor mind-made nor purely ideal fancy but eternal and of objective significance. The domain of this world of mathematics must be exploited as much as the domain of natural science. Professor Keyser says:

"Just as the astronomer, the physicist, the geologist, or other student of objective science looks abroad in the world of sense, so, not metaphorically speaking but literally, the mind of the mathematician goes forth into the universe of logic in quest of the things that are there; exploring the heights and depths for facts—ideas, classes, relationships, implications, and the rest; observing the minute and elusive with the powerful microscope of his Infinitesimal Analysis; observing the elusive and vast with the limitless telescope of his Calculus of the Infinite; making guesses regarding the order and internal harmony of the data observed and collated; testing the hypotheses, not merely by the complete induction peculiar to mathematics, but, like his colleague of the outer world, resorting also to experimental tests and incomplete induction; frequently finding it necessary, in view of unforeseen disclosures, to abandon a once hopeful hypothesis or to transform it by retrenchment or by enlargement:—thus, in his own domain, matching, point for point, the processes, methods and experience familiar to the devotee of natural science."

THE PERSISTENT PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. An Introduction to Metaphysics Through the Study of Modern Systems. By *Mary Whiton Calkins*. New York: Macmillan, 1907. Pp. xxii, 575. Price \$2.50 net.

The author says in the preface, "I have audaciously attempted to combine what seem to me the essential features of a systematic Introduction to Metaphysics with those of a History of Modern Philosophy. This I have done both because I believe that the problems of philosophy are, at the outset, best studied as formulated in the actual systems of great thinkers, and because the historical sequence of philosophies, from Descartes's to Hegel's, seems to coincide, roughly, with a logical order."

In order to accomplish this task the author has classified the best known